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The Need For Exchange Rates Convergence in Nigeria
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P. J. Obaseki*

This paper examined the relevance ofexchange rates convergence in the context
of a realistic exchange rate and the implementation of a successful Economic
Adjustment Programme, with particular reference to external sector competitiveness
and viability. The paper was unambiguous in respect of the superiority oj
convergence over other schemes ranging from multiple to a dual exchange rate
system. A unified exchange rate system, resulting from a free interplay of market
forces, eliminates waste arising_from subsidies and inefficient allocation offoreign
exchange. A unified rate also reduces rent-seeking behaviours that flourish under a
dual or multiple exchange rate system. After an analysis ofNigeria :S- experience
in Exchange Rate Management and the experiences of other countries, the
conclusion was arrived at that three main factors: relative inflation rates, growth
in money stock and rate of economic growth are crucial influences on the
exchange rate. The paper observed that fiscal and monetary policies should be
supportive of the exchange rate mechanism to ensure its stability. The empirical
analysis attempted in the paper showed that, although fiscal operations of
government exert the most significant influence on the parallel market premium,
money supply and the growth rate ofthe GDP are also relevant. The inflation rate
should be tackled on a sustainable basis to ensure that it does not grow rapidly and
out oftune with those oftrading partners countries. The rate ofeconomic growth
should also be stepped up to ensure sustained improvement in the exchange rate of
the domestic currency. The paper observed further that a realistic exchange rate
can be achieved through re-alignment on the basis of rational approaches or the
application of market forces in the determination of the exchange rate, as is
currently done under the Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (AFEM). The
paper ended on the note that monetary and fiscal policies should be reinforcing
and in conformity with the achievement ofsustainable exchange rate convergence.

Mr. P. J. Obaseki is a Principal Economist m the Research Department. Central Bank of Nigeria. The views expressed are
those ofthe author and not necessarily shared by the Bank.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to maximize the gains of Structural Adjustment, Nigeria has adopted
many policy measures since 1986 meant to evolve a realistic exchange rate
mechanism and ultimately achieve ex_change rates convergence. Since 1995,
exchange rate policy has been directed at the achievement of the convergence of
the autonomous and parallel market rates and the ultimate convergence of the
official and autonomous exchange rates. The pegged official exchange rate was
expected to gradually merge with the CBN intervention rate or the commercial
exchange rate after some stability has been achieved in the inter-bank market. The
identification of the reasons that have militated against the attainment ofexchange
rates convergence in Nigeria and the appropriate measures to be put in place in
order to achieve same are the issues that this paper is concerned with.
The exchange rate, when applied in conjunction with other macroeconomic
policies, is expected to lead to the achievement of the goals of price stability,
improved and sustained economic growth, reduced unemployment and balance of
payments stability. An optimal and stable exchange rate system would help in
achieving these macroeconomic objectives. The exchMge rate has to be right and
stable since it is an important relative price that influences other prices. When the
exchange rate is not optimal, however, the achievement of these objectives
becomes difficult and often impossible. For example, if the exchange rate is not in
equilibrium, it allows rent-seekers and speculators to exploit the subsidy element
involved. The situation is worse when a parallel market develops as a result of
restrictions in the official market and the inability of the market to satisfy-fully the
demand for foreign exchange. Thus, the opportunity cost of transacting business in
the official market is the value of the subsidy or the premium that would otherwise be
lost by the official sector but gained by third party arbitraguers and speculators. The
destabilizing nature of foreign exchange subsidy (premium) is the fundamental
reason why unification of exchange rates is canvassed as a short to medium term
objective of exchange rate management The smaller the parallel market relative to
the official market, and the higher the demand and supply elasticities of foreign
exchange in the official market relative to the parallel market, the closer the unified
equilibrium rate is likely to be to the official rate. However, if there is a large
unsatisfied demand in the official market which cannot be diverted to the parallel
market because of administrative restrictions, the equilibrium rate in a unified
market would tend to be closer to the parallel market rate or could even be beyond
it (Johnson et al, IMF 1985). The retention of a dual exchange rate system for a
long time would be counter-productive in the long-run by undermining the
objectives of exchange rate stability and structural reform-of an economy. The
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continued existence of dual or multiple rates would also encourage wasteful
allocation of resources, thereby stunting economic recovery and growth. Foreign
exchange liberalization, accompanied by appropriate demand mauagement policies
targeted at ensuring macroeconomic stability is necessary for exchange rate convergence,
if the costs (subsidy) are to be reduced. This is because the burden of adjustment is
often borne by the official exchange rate.
One of the broad objectives of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
introduced in Nigeria in 1986 was to achieve macroeconomic stability by reducing
the level of inflation, through the achievement of a stable and realistic exchange rate.
Towards this end, government decided to deregulate exchange rate determination and
the foreign exchange allocation system by relying largely on market forces. In this
regard, various allocation mechanisms, beginning from the Second-tier Fore"ign
Exchange Market (SFEM), the inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM), the
Dutch Auction System (DAS) to the Pro-rata System and, lately, fixing of the
official exchange rate and application of a free market exchange rate for purely
commercial transactions, were adopted in order to achieve the goals of policy.
However, the stability in exchange rates has continued to elude the economy. As
earlier indicated, the most serious problem has been the wide divergence between
the official and parallel market exchange rates. All attempts to achieve convergence of these rates have resulted in further devaluation of both the official and
parallel rates. As long as convergence is not achieved, exchange rate stability will
prove difficult to realize and the naira would remain under considerable pressure.
In contrast, however, some African countries have made significant strides towards achieving convergence. According to the World Bank, Ghana, Uganda, the
Gambia and Mauritius, by implementing well focused adjustment measures, have
already achieved full unification of their exchange rates. In the Sudan and Zambia,
where the process suffered from many reversals, unification has been largely achieved.
The experiences of these countries would be compared against Nigeria's
experience so as to draw important lessons that would assist the country in its efforts to
achieve convergence. Conceptually, exchange rates convergence refers to the
evolvement of a single or unified exchange rate system that is consistent with and
supported by growth-oriented monetary and fiscal policies. Empirical estimations would,
therefore, be attempted to establish the claims on the impact of premium on the rate
of economic growth. This approach is being adopted because of the policy
relevance of the subject. It is, therefore, useful to present both the qualitative and
quantitative aspects of the subject. The rest of the paper is organized as follows,
Part II is devoted to the examination of Selected Country Experiences with
Exchange Rates Convergence/Unification, while Part III provides the Theoretical
and Policy Framework for the paper. Model specification, Data Analysis, Model
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Estimation and Interpretation of Results are contained in Part IV. The paper ends
in Part V with Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations.

II. SELECTED COUNTRY EXPERIENCES WITH EXCHANGE RATES
CONVERGENCE/UNIFICATION
This section concentrates on some countries that have experienced similar problems that Nigeria is currently facing and have been able to adopt appropriate policies
to achieve exchange rates convergence, accompanied by reasonable macroeconomic
stability. Selected case studies are presented below starting with a general discussion
ofthe situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Thereafter, exchange rate management
in Nigeria is examined to draw conclusions on the extent to which policies have been
directed towards achieving convergence and unification of exchange rates.
The analysis of relevant indicators in respect of some countries that have achieved
some measure of convergence reflects mixed results and inconclusive direction of
effects of convergence. This is probably so because of the short period of convergence and the continuous efforts geared towards ensuring that the convergence is
sustained. Once enduring stability has been achieved, the effects of convergence
would become more apparent. Most Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries
operated a dual exchange rate system in the early 1980s before they embarked on
structural reforms. The official exchange rate was relatively less depreciated and
hence lower than the parallel market exchange rate. Priority imports were settled
at the official rate, while other foreign exchange transactions were settled at the
parallel market exchange rate. Most of the reforms in the SSA countries evolved
through transitional phases. The transition included movement from mechanisms
where price was exogenously determined to those where price determination was
endogenous. Some of the countries operated " own funds scheme" where
autonomous funds were allowed to reside with the owners and were used as the
owners wished. The own funds scheme was operated along-side export liberalization. In some cases, this scheme was supplemented by the liberalization of import
licensing. Under the system, most imports were placed under Open General Licence (OGL). This resulted in a non-discriminatory allocation of foreign exchange.
To reduce anti-export bias, the Export Retention Scheme (ERS) was applied by
some countries. Under the scheme, exporters were allowed to retain all or
substantial part of their foreign exchange earnings. The need for the ERS was
reinforced when the gap between the official and parallel market was substantial.
Most African countries have pursued partial unification on a gradual basis, while
others like Ghana and Uganda have achieved full unification. The key to successful
unification has been the acceptance of the need for consistency between the unified
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exchange rate and monetary and fiscal policies. Efforts at unification should be
supported by tight budgetary and restrictive monetary policy. Otherwise,
unification would not correspond with convergence if monetary and fiscal policies
are not supportive.
In the drive to deregulate the foreign exchange market, ensure that a crisis free
mechanism for foreign exchange allocation evolves and thus lay a solid foundation
for exchange rates unification, foreign exchange bureaux were established in some
SSA countries. The bureaux legalized some portions of the parallel market
transactions and brought them under the control of the formal sector. The
establishment of the inter-bank market is the final stage towards convertibility,
especially for current account transactions. Although an inter-bank system is
relatively unregulated, some prudential regulations are usually applied. An
inter-bank market reduces anti-export bias, ensures more efficient allocation of
foreign exchange, virtually eliminates the spread between the official and parallel
rates and reduces the scope for parallel market activities. The double auction
system, a mid-way between the auction and inter-bank system, which enables
sellers and buyers of foreign exchange to submit bids and approximates an
inter-bank system when successfully implemented, has been applied in isolated cases.
Experimentation with the double auction system would indicate the volume of
autonomous funds that may be available for operating an inter-bank system, given
that the exchange rate is right and largely market-determined.
The performance of some SSA countries in their attempts to unify their
exchange rates has been mixed. While some have succeeded and unified rapidly,
others have recorded reversals and yet some have not got their bearing right. In the
last case, attempts at unification have provoked new problems and compounded
the problems that structural reforms attempted to address. Ghana, considered the
most successful example in SSA in the design and implementation of trade policy,
introduced a dual exchange rate system in September 1986. In February 1988,
foreign exchange bureaus were legalized and were allowed to bid in auctions in
December 1989. In March, 1992 the auction market was replaced with an
inter-bank market. Uganda started an auction system in 1982 on an experimental
basis. Foreign exchange bureaus were legalized in 1992 and in 1993, a weekly
Dutch Auction System (DAS) was introduced. Both banks and bureaus
participated in the DAS. The auctions in Ghana and Uganda were, however, largely
donor-funded. Ghana and Uganda have continuously reformed their foreign
exchange systems and at the moment are operating inter-bank systems. In
Tanzania, there are no limits on foreign exchange transactions. For instance, no
limits are set for Basic Travel Allowance (BTA). This creates confidence in the
system. The parallel market has thus, become less important and exchange rates

I
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have largely converged. In the Gambia, most foreign exchange resides in the
private banks. These banks transact foreign exchange business among themselves
with the Central Bank playing only a monitoring role. As a result, exchange rates
have converged in the Gambia. Exchange rates unification has also been achieved
in Mauritius, and the Sudan and Zambia that suffered reversals initially, largely due
to policy inconsistencies and rapid changes in policy stance.
An illustrative scenario of how specific countries have tackled the issue of
exchange rates convergence is summarized as follows:

a. Kenya
In Kenya, foreign exchange bearer certificates (Forex C-market) were
introduced in August 1991 as a complementary source of foreign exchange to the
official (Central Bank) source. The certificates were issued to holders of foreign
exchange and they can be easily converted into cash as the need arises, without the
owners of the certificates being questioned as to source. This arrangement
eliminated the need to source all foreign exchange required from the Central Bank.
The initiative was meant to enlarge the scope of the officially recognized foreign
exchange market, tap the resources of the parallel market, encourage overseas
residents to remit funds home without reprisals and, overall, to "turn black money
white" i.e. to absorb all hidden foreign exchange inflows. The Central Bank's
auctions were done at controlled exchange rates while the Forex-C market was
supply/dem~nd related with average premium hovering between 15 and 20 per cent
above the official exchange rate. An inter-bank market evolved under the
new dispensation. A Foreign Exchange Retention Scheme (FRS) was introduced
in May 1993 where 50 per cent of foreign exchange earnings of non-traditional
exports could be kept at the initial stage, with the coverage extended to all exports
subsequently with 100 per cent allowable retention. In 1994, the FRS was
liberalized and all holders of foreign exchange were allowed to participate in the
scheme. The domestic currency, the shilling, was floated in October 1993, after the
merger of the official and inter-bank markets when the former was devalued by 60
per cent. The Central Bank introduced weekly foreign exchange auctions for
commercial banks, while import licensing and all exchange controls were
abolished. An inter-bank market has since evolved and has completely absorbed
the parallel market. In addition, the inter-bank market is linked with the stock
exchange.
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b. Malawi

In Malawi, the authorities liberalized entry procedures in the financial sector in
1991, and abolished exchange controls in 1994 in order to revitalize the external sector.
Exporters were permitted to open foreign exchange proceeds retention accounts with
commercial banks where earnings up to 90 per cent could be lodged. Thereafter, the
domestic currency, the Kwacha, was floated with commercial banks given freedom to
determine exchange rates according to market conditions. Exchange rates were determined through weekly auctions. In 1992, Bureaux de Change were introduced and
retention proceeds increased to 100 per cent. At the commencement of the new
system, the Kwacha declined in value by 50 per cent vis-a-vis the dollar. An
inter-bank market has evolved with demand and supply relied upon to determine
the exchange rate of the K wacha.
c. Tanzania
In the course of financial deregulation, foreign exchange transactions were
liberalized in 1992 in Tanzania with the licensing of Bureaux de Change and the
operation of Foreign Currency Accounts by nationals, free of any enquiry as to
source of lodgement. Bureaux de Change operations in Tanzania are very liberal.
Nationals are allowed to purchase foreign exchange up to $10,000 for every trip
out of Tanzania without restrictions as to number and time frame. Exporters are
also allowed to retain their entire foreign exchange proceeds (100 per cent). Thus,
from August 1993 some convergence has been achieved between official
commercial bank and Bureaux de Change rates, as only marginal differences exist
between the rates. Tanzania has also been able to evolve an inter-bank system
predicated on supply and demand conditions in the market with the Central Bank
only intervening to smoothen the path of exchange rate movement.
d. India
India is one developing country that has achieved current account and some form
of capital account convertibility. India's strong economic adjustment policies earned
the Rupee, the domestic currency, an early current account convertibility. The export
sector was extensively liberalized with exporters granted concessions to operate
foreign currency retention accounts. Retention limits were directly related to the
degree of export orientation. Thus, export processing zones, electronic hardware
and software technology units had higher retention levels. The capital market was
also liberalized with foreign brokers allowed to operate on behalf of foreign
investors. In addition, customs duty rates and taxes were reduced for domestic
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companies. The restrictive demand management policies of India helped in no
small way in ensuring the successful implementation of the foreign exchange
programme. The automatic monetisation of government deficits by the Central
Bank was phased out. India operates an inter-bank system where the Rupee
exchange rate is determined on the basis of supply and demand.
11.2 REVIEW OF NIGERIA'S EXCHANGE RATE
MANAGEMENT (1986 - 1997)

Prior to September 26, 1986 when the naira was floated in the Second-tier
Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), the domestic currency was managed under a
fixed exchange rate mechanism and international transactions were subjected to
extensive exchange and trade controls and regulations. With the SFEM, foreign
exchange transactions were liberalized. The floating of the naira was predicated on
the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July 1986 as a
vehicle for turning around both the external and domestic sectors of the economy.
Exchange rate adjustment, towards an optimal level, was a major element of the
SAP. With SAP, the export business was liberalized through the abolition of export
licensing. Under the SFEM, exporters were allowed to hold I 00 per cent of their
foreign exchange proceeds in domiciliary accounts and they were allowed
unhindered access to the funds therein. The SFEM was operated alongside a
managed first-tier official exchange rate, while the second-tier rate was based largely
on market forces. Transitional transactions and pre-SFEM transactions such as,
debt service payments, public sector imports, expenditure of Nigeria's missions
abroad and payments to international organizations were effected through the
first-tier rate. Other private sector transactions were effected at the second-tier
rate which was relatively more depreciated. Various methods of exchange rate
determination; average of successful bids, marginal rate pricing, and Dutch
Auction System were applied.
The first and second-tier exchange rates were merged in July 1987. An
autonomous market for foreign exchange, where the banks transacted foreign
exchange business among themselves, was evolved in 1988 but was discontinued in
1989 as a result of its destablising tendencies. The autonomous rates were sharply
depreciated and they fueled rent-seeking activities. The SFEM and the autonomous
market were eventually merged into an enlarged inter-bank market. The inter-bank
market used a number of criteria for determining the exchange rate. One or more of
the numerous criteria ranging from simple average, weighted average, to monitoring
developments in exchange rates of convertible currencies was applied to determine
the exchange rate at different times. There was, therefore, no specific criterion for
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determining the exchange rate.
The Bureaux de Change were established in 1989 to accord small users greater
access to foreign exchange, widen the scope of the officially recognized foreign
exchange market and make foreign exchange transactions less cumbersome and
less formal for small transactors. The Bureaux de Change were also expected to
gradually absorb the informal foreign exchange market as a secondary objective.
In order to further reduce instability in the Foreign Exchange Market, the
inter-bank procedures were modified in December 1990, when the Dutch Auction
System (DAS) was re-introduced. The DAS was first applied in April 1987, but
the instability in the foreign exchange market could not be stemmed. As a result, a
modal weighted average method of exchange rate determination was introduced in
August 1991 . Under the system, the rates tending towards the mode were used to
determine the market exchange rate. The system succeeded in reducing wide
fluctuations in the official exchange rate, but instability soon set in as the parallel
market commenced a process of sustained depreciation, leading to the widening of
the premium between the parallel and the official market. For example, the parallel
market premium reached 79.2 per cent in February 1992, compared with 35.5 per
cent in 1991 and the internationally acceptable standard of 5.0 per cent. To arrest
the drift, the CBN completely floated the naira on March 5, 1992. . Under the
system, the CBN was ready to sell unlimited amounts of foreign exchange provided
the appropriate naira cover was provided. Initially, the parallel market premium
narrowed to a level below 10 per cent. However, as a result of renewed demand
pressures and speculative activities, the premium started to widen again.
The official exchange rate for the naira was administratively pegged at N2 l. 9960
for most of 1993, while foreign exchange allocation was done on a pro-rata basis.
As a result, the parallel market exchange rate continued to diverge widely from the
official exchange rate with the Bureaux de Change exhibiting similar trends. The
emerging parallel market premium was considered too large to be allowed to persist as it was a disincentive to the policy stance of achieving exchange rate stability
and optimal foreign exchange allocation. Thus in 1994, the Federal Government
formally pegged the official exchange rate at N 21.9960 = $1.00, re-affirmed the illegality of the parallel market for foreign exchange transactions and prevented Bureaux de
Change from selling foreign exchange. All foreign exchange receipts were also
centralized in the CBN. A Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee, later re-named
Ministerial Allocation Committee, was set up to oversee foreign exchange allocation.
The Ministerial Allocation Committee was later dissolved and replaced with a new
one headed by the Central Bank. The pro-rata system of allocation of foreign
exchange was continued in 1994. Initially, the manufacturing sub-sector, finished
goods, agriculture and invisibles were allocated 50, 30, 10 and 10 per cent,
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respectively. However, in March 1994, the manufacturing sub-sector's share was
increased to 60 per cent, while that for finished goods was reduced to 20 per cent.
With the setting up of the Ministerial Allocation Committee in May 1994, and the
objective of allocating available foreign exchange to meet the basic needs of
end-users, 15.0 per cent of available foreign exchange was set aside for priority
imports and scheduled for allocation every fortnight. The remaining 85 per cent
was allocated on a pro-rata basis using the earlier formula. Allocation for priority
items was later raised to 20 per cent.
The re-regulation of the economy in 1994 rather than shoring up the value of
the naira and stabilizing the foreign exchange market, further reduced the value of
the naira and set in a self-sustaining phenomenon of exchange rate depreciation in
the parallel market. The measures put in place to manage foreign exchange in 1994
failed to address the crucial issues of improving foreign exchange receipts through
raising the level of non-oil exports and enhanced capital inflow. The problem ofthe
widening paral:lel market premium-could also not be addressed. At the end of 1994,
the parallel market premium was in excess of 350 per cent. This was highly
destabilizing and constituted an urgent issue for policy action. The pegging of
interest rates also failed to stimulate the productive sectors of the economy.
Non-oil exports production and foreign exchange earnings were not enhanced and
the balance of payments remained under considerable pressure. The attempt to
forcefully liquidate the parallel market by legislation instead of applying fiscal and
monetary instruments of restraint also showed that the fundamental problem of
foreign exchange scarcity was yet to be addressed decisively.
Against the background ofpersistent instability in the foreign exchange market,
declining non-oil export receipts, widening parallel market premium, and sustained
pressure on the external sector resulting from inappropriate policy measures adopted
in 1994, and the attendant rising inflationary spiral, a reversal of policy stance was
effected in 1995. The 1994 policy which centralized all foreign exchange receipts
in the CBN was discontinued. The foreign exchange market which was
re-regulated in 1994 was deregulated again in 1995 under a policy of "guided
deregulation". The goal of foreign exchange and exchange rate policy since 1995
centered on the deliberate build-up of external reserves to improve the
credit-worthiness of the Nigerian economy and its competitiveness, strengthen
the naira and gradually move the currency towards convertibility. The CBN
foreign exchange holdings were to be deployed to build-up reserves, finance
priority public sector transactions, including debt service payments and intervene
in the foreign exchange market to ensure reasonable stability. The major element of
the deregulation was the re-introduction of the Autonomous Market for Foreign
Exchange (AFEM). The AFEM is a channel for funding end-users' requests for
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foreign exchange at market-determined rates. The banks and Bureaux de Change
are the major institutions in the AFEM. While banks are eligible to deal in both
official funds (on behalf of end-users) and autonomous funds, Bureaux de Change
can only transact business with autonomous funds. Bureaux de Change which
were barred from selling foreign exchange in 1994 became eligible again, while
domiciliary accounts can now be kept with private banks as in the past, except oil
companies and public sector entities which are required to continue to keep such
accounts with the CBN to prevent them from influencing developments in the AFEM.
The CBN monitors developments in the AFEM and intervenes when necessary to keep
exchange rates within desired or targeted levels. The fixed exchange rate of
$1.00 = N'.22.00 was retained for eligible public sector transactions, including debt
service payments and National Priority Projects. Transactions eligible for financing
through the concessionary official exchange rate are verified by the Federal Minister of
Finance. The distinguishing features of the new AFEM vis-a-vis the one that was
abolished in 1989, is its enlarged institutional scope and the prohibition of
inter-bank dealings with official intervention funds in the market. In the pre-1989
dispensation, the autonomous market was mainly an inter-bank market and official
foreign exchange was eligible for transactions in the market.
While adopting the new foreign exchange policy, the thinking of policy makers
was that since exchange rate stability could not be achieved under the subsidized
foreign exchange allocation systems operated in the past, a more liberalized and
market-based system could substantially reduce the parallel market premium and
the demand for foreign exchange. The AFEM is expected to reduce the parallel
market premium and eventually ensure the convergence of the various exchange
rates in a single and enlarged foreign exchange market. It is also expected to
stabilize the naira exchange rate, induce increases in non-oil export receipts and
reduce excessive demand pressures in the foreign exchange market. To address the
initial supply problems in the AFEM and prevent exchange rate volatility, the CBN
intervenes in the market as it deems fit by selling foreign exchange to end-users
through selected authorized dealers. The CBN could also buy foreign exchange
from the AFEM to stabilize exchange rates as situations demand.
Other measures introduced in 1995 to ensure the smooth functioning of the AFEM
are the abrogation of the Exchange Control Act of 1962 and the Enterprises Promotion
Decree of 1989, and the permission granted to exporters to sell their export proceeds at
autonomous rates to banks other than those in which they maintain domiciliary accounts.
The 1995 policy measures were retained in 1996. In 1997, current accounts transactions
were extensively liberalized with the limits on Basic and Personal Travel Allowances and
remittances for educational instructions abroad removed, in addition to the lifting of the
suspension on open accounts and bills for collection as modes ofintemational payments.
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III.

THEORETICAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

111.1 Theoretical Framework And Review of Relevant Literature

A unified exchange rate system should be able to lead an economy towards the
achievement of exchange rate stability and ultimately, balance of payments stability.
In order to achieve the type of unification that would guarantee the desired
macroeconomic balance, some minimum conditions must be observed. These
include the achievement of a realistic or equilibrium exchange rate and the
consistent application of restrictive demand management policies. To achieve a
realistic exchange rate, the rate of domestic productivity must be stepped up,
inflation would have to be curtailed, while a tight hold should be put on money
supply. When the exchange rate is mis-aligned vis-a-vis trading partners' currencies, instability soon sets into the Foreign Exchange Market and the reactivation
ofrent-seeking behaviours encourages the development of other markets.
Although it is generally agreed that exchange rate convergence improves
welfare through a more efficient allocation of resources vis-a-vis the inefficiency
ascribed to a multiple exchange rate system, the application of a uniform model for
determining the effect of convergence has not been conclusively fashioned out.
However, there exists a number of measures that could serve as guide in the
determination of the effects of convergence on an economy. There is the well
known efficient market hypothesis which assumes that exchange rate is expected to
follow a random walk or a near random walk as current levels relate to preceding
levels and expectation based on information available. The official exchange rate
failed to behave in this manner as a result of its pegging in 1993, while the parallel
market exchange rate was influenced largely by speculative factors. Since prices
are indexed on the basis of the parallel rates, it follows that to ensure efficiency and
reduce resource misallocation, convergence should be encouraged towards the
parallel market exchange rate in the first instance, while the market should be
allowed to rely on available information subsequently, with the CBN intervening in
the market to influence exchange rates towards the desired level.
Wide parallel market premium introduces some instability into the Foreign
Exchange Market. The higher the premium, the greater the incentive to falsify
export invoices and to divert export proceeds to the unofficial market (Agenor
1992:928). Although the Agenor study indicated that unification could lead to
increased inflation and reduction in output when a real appreciation of the exchange
rate occurs, the situation is reversed in countries like Nigeria that are net sellers
rather than net buyers of foreign exchange.
The argument that multiple exchange rates misallocate resources is at the root
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of the arguments for unification of exchange rates. According to Pinto (1990:322)
unification would eliminate the subsidy on foreign exchange to the private sector
and improve fiscal deficits for a net seller. The effects of unification according to
Pinto could be examined through the identification of the determinants of the parallel market premium. Pinto's study focused on the inflation and fiscal effects of
exchange rate unification for a net buyer of foreign exchange. According to him,
unification would lead to reduced revenue, widening of fiscal deficit and rising
inflation. This submission could be posed in the reversed form for a net seller of
foreign exchange. In this sense, unification would result in increased revenue,
reduced fiscal deficits through the elimination of subsidies and price stability in the
medium to long-term. Furthermore, the depreciation of the real exchange rate would
improve the trade balance and impact positively on the gross domestic product (GDP).
The traditional argument of disincentive to exports of a multiple exchange rate
system and the ultimate reduction in capacity utilization does not appear valid under
the current dispensation in Nigeria. Other factors relating to government fiscal
operations appear more plausible.
Pinto (1990:327) identified the determinants of parallel market premium as
demand for domestic money, the financing of fiscal deficits, the rate ofinflation and
the terms of trade, or the ratio of price of exports to imports. Pinto 's study showed
further that the black market premium meant a bigger real transfer of resources
from government to the private sector and the reduced income led to the reliance
on inflationary fiscal operations. The disincentive effects of the premium showed in
reduced non-oil exports. Generally, Pinto (1990:335) argued that inflation rises
because the devaluation involved in unification eliminates revenue from purchasing
export earnings at the overvalued official exchange rate which requires increased
monetisation to finance a set level of government expenditure. This conclusion no
longer holds in its entirety for Nigeria since the introduction of the AFEM in 1995.
However, the fact remains that the subsidized official exchange rate encourages
some rent-seeking behaviours that precipitate capital flight and decline in real
sector activities, especially in manufacturing.
The determinants of the premium in Nigeria include the growth in the money
stock, the growth in the gross domestic product (GDP), the inflation rate, the index
of competitiveness (the ratio of domestic to foreign prices or the real exchange rate
index), the supply of foreign exchange, movement in the trade balance, and fiscal
operations of government. As a result of what is on the ground at the moment,
inflation, GDP, money stock and fiscal deficit are appropriate explanatory variables
for movements in the parallel market premium. The most important aspect of this
paper is the establishment of some negative relationship between premium and GDP
growth in order to be categorical on the welfare-reducing effect of the parallel
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market premium.
It has also been established in the literature that the more liberalized an economy
is, the more unified its exchange rate system and the higher the rate of economic
growth. While the index of openness, total trade/GDP is expected to move directly
with economic growth, this has not been established in the case of Nigeria. Ekpo
( 1995) applied an augmented production function approach to determine the effect
of the liberalization following the implementation of Nigeria's SAP. His findings
were that the openness of the economy has not promoted economic growth. The
result is to be expected since the accompanying elements oftrade liberalization like
competitive tariffs, a realistic exchange rate and macroeconomic balance were not
achieved. The situation has, however, become more comfortable in the last couple
of years with relative macroeconomic stability and a more appropriate exchange
rate.
With a generalized illegal parallel market for foreign exchange, an increase in
the rate of domestic credit will boost domestic prices and the black market
premium (Edwards, 1992:54). The effect would be unsustainable macroeconomic
developments that would elicit moves towards exchange rates unification to
eliminate the destabilising premium. Usually, the burden of adjustment is on the
official exchange rate. Quirk (1992:138) established that a bivariate relationship
exists between black market exchange rates and broad money (lagged one period)
for a broad sample of 13 major developing countries for the period 1977 - 1989.
Quirk further observed that while the official exchange rate remained fixed,
monetary developments determined the behaviour of the private sector.
Furthermore, the parallel market premium, taken as a disequilibrium variable,
impacts on other macroeconomic aggregates. Studies for Latin American and East
Asian countries have established the negative impact of the parallel market
premium on long-run growth performance.
Kamin ~1992:211) identified the rationale for operating a multiple exchange
rate system and the problems that could be encountered, necessitating unification
of exchange rates. When a pegged official exchange rate exists for current account
transactions and a floating rate is applied for capital account transactions, domestic
prices may be insulated from exchange rate fluctuations. On the other hand, the
official exchange rate may become overvalued, making the economy
uncompetitive. Leakages from one segment of the market to another may be
difficult to prevent, and since multiple exchange rates create opportunities for sharp
practices, it becomes difficult to ascertain the limits of legal activities. There is,
therefore, a need to unify exchange rates and apply appropriate macroeconomic
policies. Kamin, (1992:215) held the view that exchange market unification and
the best means of achieving unification are somewhat academic, and that macro-
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economic policies are far more important than exchange rate policies in ensuring
stable prices, output and stable financial system. The importance ofmacroeconomic
policies cannot be contested. However, sound macroeconomic policies are
predicated pn an optimal exchange rate that would ensure external balance.
Furthermore, the problems with a multiple exchange rate system identified by Kamin
do not support his conclusion. The fact remains that although multiple exchange
rates may be advantageous in certain circumstances, they are prone to abuses and
political manipulations which ultimately result in macroeconomic instability,
especially when the official exchange rate is overvalued for a long period of time.
There is strong evidence from studies conducted by the World Bank on the
long-term growth inducing effect of unification and the ha,rmful effects of large
premiums (Kiguel et al, 1994:34). In the studies, the retention of large premiums
lead to macroeconomic distortions and rampant corruption. However, exchange
rate unification can only be successful in establishing internal and external balance
when appropriate complementary monetary and fiscal policies are put in place.
The more an economy is liberalized, the less efficacious the operation of a
multiple or a dual exchange rate ~ystem. The institution of a realistic exchange rate
mechanism and a competitive tariffstructure, in addition to complementary monetary
and fiscal policies would ensure better economic performance. This is because the
authorities could apply demand management and trad·e polices to achieve set
economic objectives without necessarily adjusting the exchange rate administratively.
When the exchange rate moves out of policy target, the monetary authorities could
intervene to smoothen the path of exchange rate movement. It should, however, be
noted that even in systems where single exchange rate exist, there is the likelihood of
leakages through speculative activities in the foreign exchange market which leads to
market inefficiency (Koedijk, 1987:6). Under normal circumstances, the exchange
rate would follow a random walk when expectation is zero or a near random walk
when expectation is equal to a constant (Humpage, 1988:3).
Marion (1994:214) expressed the view that the classical dual rate system (DRS)
introduces distortion into asset portfolios as a result of the spread between the
pegged and the floating exchange rate, and the evolution of the spread overtime.
The distortions are also reinforced by the inability to separate the markets (Bhandari
and Decaluwe 1_987, Gros 1988). The widening of the premium encourages
-rent-seeking behaviour. Marion applied a simple model to identify key
determinants of the dual exchange rate premium. The premium in a reduced foIJtl
equation depends on the rate of depreciation of the commercial (floating exchange
rate), real income, and the initial stock of foreign assets at the onset of the dual
exchange rate in the Marion study. This may be an appropriate model for Europe
and Latin America that Marion study covered. In the case of developiq.g countries
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that are striving to establish macroeconomic balance, other variables like fiscal
operations, money supply, demand and supply relationship in the foreign exchange
markets are crucial in determining the level of the premium. This paper will
attempt to examine the effect of the foreign exchange premium, in the case of
Nigeria, the parallel market premium and other associated factors on the rate of
economic growth. This is necessary to establish the need for policy reversal.

111.2

The Policy Nexus

The need for exchange rates unification is not far-fetched. It impinges on the
oYerall objective of efficient and optimal economic management. Unification
reduces the attraction of the parallel market and in fact absorbs it into the general
framework of the formal foreign exchange market, thereby eliminating distortions
inherent in differential rates in the foreign exchange market. Although
macroeconomic balance is assumed to precede and sustain a unified exchange
rate, unification reinforces stability in macroeconomic aggregates. Destablising
influences of speculators and arbitraguers are reduced under a unified exchange
rate system through the curtailment of rent-seeking behaviours. When the unified_
exchange rate is determined at the optimal and realistic level,1it promotes the inflow
of foreign capital and export production, and discourages rtapital flight.
An optimal unification of exchange rates leads to a more'rational deployment of
foreign exchange, thereby reducing wastes. It also makes it easier to move the
economy along the path of sustainable growth and ultimate balance of payments
equilibrium. Under a unified system, unproductive and distortionary subsidies would
be curtailed and producers and investors would be operating in a stable
environment where projections would become more useful and rewarding. Thus,
decision-making would become less cumbersome and devoid of extreme
uncertainties and arbitrariness. It is also easier to achieve an equilibrium exchange
rate under a unified system. The initial impact of increased inflation rate and
possible loss of output would be ameliorated when complementary demand
management policies and supply side initiatives are applied on a sustained basis.
Although the direction of adjustment would be the depreciation of the official
exchange rate or its discontinuation which effectively amounts to a devaluation, the
improvement in economic conditions would gradually lead to the appreciation of
the exchange rate and a decline in the inflation rate. However one, looks at it, the
parallel market exchange rate determines the level of the unified exchange rate in
order to effectively reduce the destabilising effect oflarge parallel market premium.
A unified exchange rate system helps to achieve better results from Structural
Adjustment Programmes. Although unification is preferred to other exchange rates
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systems, its implementation can only be successful when macroeconomic balance is
achieved and maintained. In this regard, fiscal and monetary policies must be in
conformity with the exchange rate policy.
IV. MODEL SPECIFICATION, DATA ANALYSIS, MODEL ESTIMATION
AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
IV.1 Model Specification

Two alternative models can be tested to establish the effect of exchange rate
convergence on the economy. The first model may apply the parallel market
premium as the dependent variable and attempt to capture the relative strengths of
the factors inducing the premium. The second model may attempt to establish the
impact of a unified exchange rate on the rate of economic growth. Thus, GDP
growth or its proxy is treated as the dependent variable. Following the efficient
market hypothesis which rules out wide deviations of exchange rate beyond market
dealers ' expectations, we can formulate the relationship of the spot exchange rate
at period t, the preceding period 's exchange rate and expectations based on
information, as follows:
st = ao + al st - I+ a 2N + ut.................................................... .. .........
(1)
where St is the spot exchange rate, St-i is the preceding period's spot exchange
rate, N represents information and Ut is error term, assumed to have zero mean,
constant variance and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Since the official exchange rate has been pegged since 1993, we can reformulate equation ( 1) as
follows:
st = s,_1. ........ .... .. • .. .. • .. .. • .. ... • .. .. ... ... .. . ... .. . .. ..... .. ..... • ..... .. ............... ....
(2)
Equation (2) means that the current spot exchange rate is the same as previous
period's exchange rate in nominal terms. Information is, therefore, unimportant
and the assumption of a random walk would not hold. As a result, an equation for
the parallel market exchange rate is introduced to provide a better explanation of
the effects of convergence or a single exchange rate system:
SP= a 0 + a 1SP1_1+ a 2M 1+ a 3M2 - a 4FX + alD + a 6GDP + u1.. .. ........... .. ... (3)
Where Sp
= parallel market exchange rate;
SP1_1
Previous period 's parallel market exchange rate;
M 1 = Narrow money supply;
= Broad money supply;
M2
FX = Supply of foreign exchange;
FD = Fiscal Deficit
GDP = Domestic output; and

291

CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, VOL 3 5, NO. 3

Ut
= Error term, as defined in (1). Redefining equation (3) to
capture the premium yields the following:
Sp-St = a o +a , s pt-1+ a 2M , + a 3M2 -alX + alD - a 6GDP- a 7St-1 + u t ... (4)
where SP - St = parallel market premium. Representing the parallel market
premium with PM and dropping other exchange rate variables, we have:
PM= a o +a,M, + a 2M2 - alX + alD - asGDP + u t ......... ...................... (5)
Equation (5) indicates that the parallel market premium is influenced by the
variables identified as M" M 2, FX, FD, and GDP. The lower the parallel market
premium the more stable the Foreign Exchange Market and the better for the
economy. Thus, an examination of the relative strengths ofthe various explanatory
variables would be helpful in arriving conclusively at measures that would help
ensure the convergence of the naira exchange rate. The a priori expectations are
indicated by the signs attached to the explanatory variables.
The alternative model draws largely from the model of openness. The extent to
which an economy is liberalized is influenced by factors such as the strength of the
domestic economy, measured by the GDP or its proxy; the competitiveness of the
external sector, the level of the exchange rate, domestic gross capital formation,
among others. The model we shall adopt in this study takes the growth rate of
GDP or its proxy as the dependent variable. The factors influencing it are identified
as the index of openness of the economy (total trade/GDP), the exchange rate,
(official, parallel, a measure of the equilibrium exchange rate, parallel market
premium) capacity utilization in the manufacturing sub-sector, money supply and
fiscal operations of government. The model is specified as follows :
GDPg = ao +a,T/y + al - a 3Ms - ally- alM - aJNF + ut ··········· ·--······ (6)
where GDPg = Growth rate of GDP;
T/y = Index of openness (total trade/GDP);
Ms = Measures of money supply;
Fly = Ratio of fiscal deficit/surplus over GDP;
P = Measure of real exchange rate, in this case
the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP);
PM = Parallel Market Premium
INF = Inflation rate; and
U1 = Error term, as defined previously.
The a priori expectations are generally expressed by the signs attached to the
variables. However, the exchange rate measures, the money stock, fiscal operations
of government and inflation rate may exhibit unpredictable movements depending on
their levels. What is certain is that openness would positively impact on growth
given the right macroeconomic environment. In the same way, a wide parallel
market premium would negatively impact on the rate of economic growth.
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For the purpose of this study only, equation (5) was estimated.

IV.2 Data Analysis
Secondary data from 1970 to 1996 are applied in the estimation of the model.
The data were sourced from CBN and FOS publications and IMF's International
Financial Statistics. The series were tested for stationarity to confirm if long run
relationships exist between them. This is necessary to establish whether the
cointegration regression method can be applied.
Stationarity simply means that the series have turning points and that after some
disturbance they return to a defined state. Such series are said to be
mean-reverting. The concept ofcointegration (Branger 1981, 1986, Hendry 1986,
Hall 1986, Mills 1990) established the link between integration processes and the
concept of steady state equilibrium. Cointegration theory assumes that even when
two series are not themselves stationary, there may exist some linear combinations
of the series that are stationary. Furthermore, cointegration technique arose from the
need to integrate short run dynamics with long run equilibri'um. Thus, it extends
beyond the partial adjustment technique.
The statistical package applied in the estimation is the Microfit Software. The
ordinary least squares method (OLS) is applied in the estimation. A partial
correlation analysis was carried out to eliminate highly correlated explanatory
variables. The regression analysis proceeded from a generalized to a specific
framework through a step-wise procedure.
The cointegration technique can be applied to determine if long run relationship
exists between the official and parallel market exchange rates, the parallel market premium and the GDP or its proxy, and inflation and the parallel market exchange rate.
The Unit root tests on variables to establish stationarity showed that the variables are
difference stationary of order 1. Both the Dickey Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) tests established this order of integration. The series are not trend stationary, but the residuals are integrated of order 1(0). Thus, a long run relationship exists
between the variables.
IV.3 Model Estimation and Interpretation of Results
The model that was estimated has the Parallel Market Premium (PMP) as the
dependent variable, with Broad Money (M2), Foreign Exchange Supply (FX),
Fiscal Deficit/Surplus (FD) and Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as
independent (explanatory) variables (see appendix).
The long run static regression was run and the a pnori expectations for the
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explanatory variables were satisfied. Residual stationarity was also established for
the model. The introduction of an error correction term into the model, after
differencing, produced different results. Foreign Exchange supply (DLFX) showed
a wrong sign, while only one variable, Fiscal deficit (FD) was statistically
significant. A negative relationship continued to be maintained between the
parallel market premium and the growth rate of GDP.
An over-parameterised model with the 4 permissible lags for all explanatory
variables was run. The results were not good enough. Only fiscal deficit lagged 1
to 3 periods was statistically significant. A step-wise regression methodology was
thereafter applied to improve on the results. The final result showed that only fiscal
deficit was statistically significant. This can be explained by the fact that monetary
policyaccommod_ates fiscal policy in Nigeria. Although money supply was not statistically significan't, it exhibited some relationship with the parallel market premium.
The growth rate of GDP showed the correct sign of inverse relationship with the
dependent variable. Overall, the variables, money supply, fiscal deficit and GDP
growth rate explained about 81 per cent of variations in the parallel market premium.
The Durbin Watson (OW) statistic was high at 2. 73, showing the absence of serial
correlation. Although the rate of growth of the GDP was not statistically significant,
the sign of the variable showed that the higher the rate of growth, the lower the
premium and vice versa. As a result, the administration of a dual exchange rate
system that automatically creates a premium constrains the rate of economic growth.
To achieve more robust resu lts, the autoregressive error specification
estimation method was applied. All the explanatory variables, money suppJ.y,
foreign exchange supply, fiscal operations of government and the growth rate of
the GDP had the right signs. In addition, the first three were statistically
significant. As a result, all the explanatory variables are important, as critical
factors in the determination of the size of the parallel market premium.

V.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

V.1 Summary
There are various exchange rate and foreign exchange management schemes
preparatory to the unification or convergence of exchange rates. Multiple or dual
exchange rates (the simplest form of multiple exchange rates) are considered to
impair economic growth and development. The simplest manifestation of a dual
exchange rate system is the parallel market premium. With exchange rates
convergence, the premium will become narrower and almost irrelevant in exchange
rate analysis.
The lack of unification or convergence of exchange rates in Nigeria, through

Obaseki 294

the application of a dual exchange rate system, has perpetuated the phenomenon of
a thriving parallel market for foreign exchange and the associated premium. The
parallel market premium is affected by government's expenditure profile,
accommodating monetary operations of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the rate of
growth of GDP, among other factors.

V.2 Conclusions
The main conclusions of the paper are that fiscal operations of government
exert a predominant influence on parallel market premium in Nigeria, while money
supply and GDP growth rate also impact on the parallel market premium. The rate
of growth of GDP exerts a negative impact on the premium. Thus, the higher the
rate of growth of GDP, the lower the premium and vice versa. Higher GDP growth
rate would reduce the reliance on imports and could even result in increased
capacity for the economy to finance imports. This explains the inverse relationship.
The implication for policy is that the existence of a wide parallel market premium,
through a system of multiple exchange rates, introduces distortions as the premium
is being fed through the diversion of funds which should have been used to finance
economic growth and development. When the gap is closed through the
implementation of a unitary exchange rate system, funds would be increasingly
channelled to the productive sectors of the economy.

V.3 Recommendations
The dual exchange rate system should be discontinued. This can be achieved
through the establishment of a unitary exchange rate. The most ideal route towards
this is the phasing out of the official exchange rate and the channelling of all
transactions through the AFEM.
The exchange rate should be monitored continuously to ensure that it is within
a competitive level that would ensure the simultaneous attainment of internal and
external balance. In this connection, inflation should be kept within levels at which
the external sector remains competitive. Fiscal operations of government should
not compromise the objective of macroeconomic and monetary stability as well as
the stability of the Foreign Exchange Market. More importantly, monetary and
fiscal policies should be complementary.

I
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APPENDIX
SELECTED REGRESSION RESULTS

De~ndent Variable
=
PMP

lnde~ndent Variables
-10.5 + 3.7LM2-2.5LFX -.0002FD-.0IGDPG
(-1.5) (1.4)
(-1.1)
(3.1)
(-0.1)

R2 fl2 SERDW
0.54 0.46 5.5 1.93

Equation2
(Error Omection Model)

PMP

=

-5.1 + l.3DLM2 + 0.73DLFX + .00019FD- .08GDPG
(2.2)
(0.2)
(0.4)
(5.4)
(0.6)
+32.4 RES(-!)
(4.6)

0.75

0.69

4.2 2.44

Equation)
(Final Stepwise Regression)

PMP

=

-4.2 + 2.IDLM2 + 0.OO0IFD + 0.OOOIFD(-1) -0.03GDPG
(-2.3) (0.4)
(3.1)
(2.6)
(-0.3)
+20.9 RES(-!)
(3.0)

0.81

0.76

3.7 2.73

Equation4
(Autoregressive Error
Specification)

PMP

=

-32.2 + 10.4LM2- 7.ILFX + .OOOIFD-0JGDPG
(1.1)
(2.1)
(3.2)
(2.2)
(-1.3)

0.58

0.45 5.6 2.2

Equation I
(Static Model)

